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Closer international economic integration is perhaps one of the most im-
portant societal trends in the last half of the twentieth century. Increased
specialization, larger scales of production and harsher competitive pressures
are likely to beneﬁt consumers across the globe. Still, the globalization of
our economies is viewed with scepticism and fear by many. Will trade liber-
alization mean the end to decent pay and job security? Will wages be set in
Beijing, to quote Freeman (1995)? Or will the good jobs disappear to non-
unionized foreign countries with more lax labor regulations, with ”a great
sucking sound”, as Ross Perot so famously put it? In short; does globaliza-
tion give capital the upper hand, either leading to job losses or to a depression
of wages? Borjas and Ramey (1995) argue that increased trade can reduce
the possibility for blue-collar workers to extract rents from their ﬁrm, and
that this can help explaining the rising wage inequality in the United States
-a n dﬁnd empirical support for their view. This type of empirical studies is
an important back-drop for the present work.
Of course, if “globalization” is taken to mean that ﬁrms and their
workers totally lose any market power they might have had, this is bound
to hurt unionized workers. But globalization can be given less extreme in-
terpretations. Here we study an international oligopoly where international
transport costs are reduced, but the number of active ﬁr m sr e m a i n st h es a m e .
This has been a popular model in the theoretical literature that studies how
unionized labor might fare in the face of globalization, as we shortly shall
review. The main novelty here is to allow for capital ﬂight, which we think
captures an important aspect of reality. We allow for two diﬀerent types
of foreign direct investment (FDI). The less dramatic case is when a ﬁrm
chooses to serve a non-unionized foreign market from a plant built in that
country rather than through exports. The more radical option is to move all
the activities of a ﬁrm to this non-unionized economy, including production
for the former home market.
It borders on the trivial to note that high union wages creates incen-
tives for capital ﬂight (of either form). It is perhaps a more subtle point that
we show that economic integration — in the sense that the marginal trade
cost is reduced — can strengthen the incentive to capital ﬂight. Common
wisdom, though, is that lower transport costs favor the export solution over
FDI, as exports become cheaper when the trade cost drops. Foreign direct
investments have been gaining in importance in world economic relations in
recent decades. At the same time there has been a strong momentum towards
trade liberalization. This is an apparent puzzle. The usual explanation is
that this is the interplay of opposing forces: Trade liberalization points at
1more exports, but ”something else” (as the ﬁxed costs of establishing foreign
plants going down in parallel with the marginal trade cost) leads the ﬁrms to
undertake more FDI [see, e.g., Markusen and Venables (1998)]. Our point is
that in an international unionized oligopoly model it can be explained how
economic integration in the sense that marginal trade costs are lowered in
itself can cause FDI.1
In general terms, our results also support the notion that the problem
with unions and economic integration is “sucking sound” job losses rather
than Beijing wages. If all union sector jobs disappear due to a full move
of the ﬁrm abroad, it is a rather academic question if one should refer to
this as a loss of jobs or a drop in wages. However, when FDI signiﬁes that
the foreign country is served by a new-built plant abroad, wages for the
remaining unionized workers are shown actually to go up: The cost saving
potential from the ﬁrm’s side is that they are fewer.
We also want to highlight the result that trade liberalization can lead to
a drop in national welfare. Unionized workers lose, and the possible gains for
other groups are not always large enough to outweigh this. One key reason
for this is that the combination of strong unions and trade liberalization can
lead the ﬁrm to invest real resources in FDI just to win a distributional battle
with the union. It also enters the picture that trade liberalization can lead
to proﬁts h i f t i n gf r o mo w n e r so fﬁrms in a unionized economy to owners of
ﬁrms in non-unionized economies.
A growing body of research studies theoretical models of international
unionized oligopoly.2 In turn, a subset of these papers study the impact
of reduced trade barriers in an international unionized oligopoly framework.
The papers that perhaps are closest to our own work are Naylor (1998, 1999).
Naylor uses a linear demand international unionized oligopoly model, just as
1The only empirical study which, to our knowledge, tests on a disaggregate level the
relationship between trade costs on the one hand and exports/FDI on the other, does not
support the standard theoretical prediction. Feinberg, Keane and Bognanno (1998) test
how MNCs and their aﬃliates responded to US-Canada tariﬀ reductions. They ﬁnd that
tariﬀ reductions led to more foreign direct investment rather than more exports. See also
Hanson (1998), which surveys the existing literature on the eﬀect of NAFTA on industry
location. The broad picture suggests that trade liberalization triggers relocation of ﬁrms.
2A seminal paper is Brander and Spencer (1988). Their main focus is on how unions
inﬂuence optimal strategic trade policy. Also Dowrick (1989) includes a trade union model
where oligopoly rents are the source of union power. Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991)
and Bughin and Vannini (1995) investigate the interrelationship between unionism and a
ﬁrm’s choice between serving a foreign market through exports or by investing abroad. In
ad i ﬀerent set-up, Zhao (1995) studies unionized international oligopoly and cross-hauling
foreign direct investment. Straume (2001) studies the scope for collusion among ﬁrms and
unions in an international oligopoly situation. However, none of these studies addresses
how closer economic integration aﬀects outcomes in unionized oligopolies.
2we do. Monopoly unions set wages, but employment determination is left to
the discretion of the ﬁrm, again just as in our model. A key point in Naylor’s
analysis is that in many popular models of wage determination, wage claims
are governed by the elasticity of labor demand rather than ﬁrms’ proﬁtabil-
ity. When trade costs are lowered, there will be harsher competition among
the participants in an international oligopoly, but the output of the ﬁrms
will go up, which in his framework (for a situation with two-way trade be-
tween the countries initially) implies that labor demand becomes less elastic.
So while ﬁrms suﬀer a proﬁt loss, unions will choose to set higher wages.3
Because of the output expansion, employment nevertheless goes up, so union-
ized labor wins on both counts. This is undeniably a more rosy account of
the impact of trade liberalization on the situation of unionized labor than
the popular notions that for example are expressed in the above Ross Perot
quote. The present paper extends Naylor’s reasoning by allowing for for-
eign direct investment. Precisely because of the tendency to wage increases
after trade liberalization that Naylor points out, trade liberalization gives
ﬁrm an increased incentive to capital ﬂight, which is not the case in a corre-
sponding model without unions. Another diﬀerence between our framework
and that of Naylor is that whereas he studies trade liberalization between
two unionized countries, we study a situation with one unionized and one
non-unionized country. Intuitively, FDI triggered by union-set wages should
be more relevant when union strength diﬀers considerably between the two
economies.4
In our model as in Naylor’s work, economic integration is pictured as a
marginal decrease of the trade cost that is incurred when goods are delivered
from one country to the other. Driﬃl and van der Ploeg (1993, 1995) study
economic integration in a similar way, but apply a model of monopolistic,
rather than oligopolistic competition.5 Alternatively, Sørensen (1993, 1994)
and Huizinga (1994) compare autarky with full integration.6 It can be argued
3This inverse relationship between trade costs and wages is also found in Driﬃla n dv a n
der Ploeg (1995). It is consistent with some empirical ﬁndings from US manufacturing
industries [see Gaston and Treﬂer (1994) and Lovely and Richardson (1998)].
4Of course, both our assumption of non-unionized labor in the foreign country and
Naylor’s assumption of equally powerful unions should be seen as benchmark cases. Even
among countries that are rather similar, as the European ones, labor market institutions
and wage structures are quite diﬀerent. Durand, Madaschi and Terribile (1998) ﬁnd signif-
icant cross-country diﬀerences in manufacturing wages between European countries, even
if cross-country diﬀerences in productivity are taken into account.
5The main focus in these latter articles is on the eﬀects of national versus international
unionism.
6It is noteworthy that these latter models yield predictions that sometimes are in
apparent contradiction to those that come out of Naylor’s analysis. For example, they
3that Naylor’s modeling approach encompasses that of Sørensen and Huizinga,
which is why we have chosen to work with a model quite close to Naylor’s
framework.7 Note that also this body of literature works with the assumption
that FDI is not possible.8
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model outline.
The model can be described as a three-stage game. In section 3, we analyze
t h et h i r ds t a g eo ft h eg a m ei nw h i c hﬁrms in an international oligopoly choose
outputs. Given the nature of the previous stages of the game, we have
to consider three possible trade/location regimes at this stage. In section
4, we analyze the second stage of the game in which monopoly unions set
wages. Again, outcomes are regime-contingent. In section 5, we analyze the
ﬁrm’s subgame perfect location choice. We show how these choices vary with
trade costs. We also consider the non-union benchmark case as a comparison
with our main results. Section 6 discusses welfare implications and section 7
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider two countries, denoted H (home) and F (foreign), and two
producers, denoted A and B. Initially, producer A is located in the home
country and producer B resides in the foreign country.9 There is a monopoly
trade union in country H, whereas labor is assumed non-unionized in country
F. Output is produced in a constant returns to scale process, with labor as
the only input. Let x and y denote A’s sales and u and v denote B’s sales in
the home and foreign countries, respectively. We assume inverse demand in
predict that trade liberalization leads the union wage to fall, whereas Naylor predicts
that it will rise. The contradiction is only apparent, though, because also Naylor’s model
predicts that the wage under autarky is higher than the one under full integration. But
given that trade costs are suﬃciently low as to induce two-way trade, a still lower trade
cost will increase the wage.
7Andersen and Sørensen (1993) and Danthine and Hunt (1994) model trade liberaliza-
tion as an increase in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
8Naylor and Sanoni (1998), however, explicitly consider foreign direct investment in a
framework corresponding to that used in Naylor (1998, 1999). This time the possibility of
serving a foreign market through exports is ruled out by assumption, so again the choice
between exports and foreign direct investment is not studied.
9We could have extended the model by, say, introducing n>1 foreign ﬁrms. That
would change our quantitative results, such as the cutoﬀ points between the regimes.
However, it can be shown that our main ﬁndings would not change.
4t h et w oc o u n t r i e st ob es y m m e t r i ca n dg i v e nb y :
p = a − b(x + u) (1)
q = a − b(v + y) (2)
a,b > 0.pis the price in the home country, while q is the price in the foreign
country.
The diﬀerence in unionization across the two countries is assumed to
imply higher costs of production in the home country relative to the foreign
one. More speciﬁcally, we model a situation where the competitive wage in
the two countries are equal (w ≥ 0) and the union in the home market sees
this wage level as their reservation wage, setting wages to maximize a simple
Stone-Geary type utility function:10
U =( w − w)z (3)
z is A’s production in the home market and equals x + y in the case of
no FDI.11 w<ais assumed.
Given our assumptions, B is located in a low cost country, and we assume
that this producer continues to produce only in that country. We look at a
situation where FDI is potentially undertaken by ﬁrm A,a n df o c u so nt w o
diﬀerent ways for that ﬁrm to invest abroad. A can sink some ﬁxed cost
J>0 to establish a new production facility in the foreign country, able to
supply that market. We will call this strategy regime II, or ‘partial FDI’.
Regime I is the base case of no investment. However, by sinking another ﬁxed
cost G, A can instead move the entire home production unit to the foreign
country, enabling A to produce for both countries in the low-cost country.
This strategy is referred to as regime III or ‘full FDI’. The relative cost of
these two investment strategies will be discussed later.
We assume competition between the two producers to be Cournot and
adopt the segmented market hypothesis. Thus both ﬁrms choose separate
quantities for the two markets. Furthermore, there is a per unit cost of trade,
denoted t ≥ 0, w h i c hi si n c u r r e db yb o t hp r o d u c e r si ft h e ya t t e m p tt oe x p o r t
10In this model, depending on trade costs and wages, either none, only one or both
ﬁrms will export. Given that the wages are endogenously determined, it is not clear how
the union and the ﬁrm should reach an agreement on whether to export, deter imports
or adapt to imports. In a right-to-manage set-up this choice would have to be bargained
over in parallel with wage determination. Using the monopoly union set-up allows both
these decisions to be taken by the union, evading the problem. This consideration applies
equally to the models of Naylor (1998, 1999).
11We have chosen this form for union utility to enable direct comparison of proﬁts and
union utility. Union utility and proﬁt sa r eh e r em e a s u r e di nt e r m so ft h es a m eu n i t .
5to the other country. Trade liberalization in our model is seen as a marginal
reduction in this cost.
We model the game structure as follows: First, the home ﬁrm chooses
whether to invest in the foreign market by either of the two ways described
above, or not to invest at all. The most irreversible decision is arguably
the one made by producer A concerning his location choice. In line with
this reasoning, it is natural to let this decision be taken ﬁrst. Next, we
assume unions to set wages, whereupon the producers simultaneously choose
quantities.12
We solve, of course, by backward induction, and the following sections
discuss the three diﬀerent stages starting with the production decision at
stage three.
3 Stage 3. Production
We distinguish among three basic scenarios at the production stage: Either
ﬁrm A has not invested (regime I), or it has invested in either of the two
possible ways (regime II or III). In addition, the wage levels have already
been determined. We also study a non-union benchmark where the wages in
the two countries are assumed constant and equal.
3.1 Regime I. No FDI
Here, ﬁrm A has not invested. Thus a simple two-plant, two country Cournot
duopoly prevails where the two producers choose quantities as follows:
x,y =a r gm a x
x,y [(a − b(x + u) − w)x +( a − b(v + y) − w − t)y] (4)
u,v =a r gm a x
u,v [(a − b(v + y) − w)v +( a − b(x + u) − t − w)u] (5)
This is of course subject to the constraint that all production quantities
should be non-negative.
It is easily demonstrated that the equilibrium sales are:
12This sequence of moves is the same as in Naylor and Santoni (1998), Bughin and
Vannini (1995), Zhao (1995) and Collie and Vandenbussche (1998). On the other hand,
if the trade union could credibly commit to a wage, results would change as unions could
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(7)
A lower wage set by the union leads to higher output of the unionized ﬁrm
in its home market and lower sales in this market by the foreign competitor
(if the latter produces for market H).I ft h ew a g ei ss u ﬃciently low relative
to the trade costs, the foreign competitor will not want to sell in market
H. This happens for w − 2t<2w − a. H o w e v e r ,i ft h ew a g ea n dt h et r a d e
costs are below some threshold (w + t<a+w
2 ), the unionized ﬁrm will be
able to export into the neighboring market. In this case, the low cost foreign
producer will also export to country H.13 Finally, there is the possibility that
none of these inequalities hold, and in this case there is one way trade into
t h eh o m em a r k e t .
3.2 Regime II. Partial FDI
In this case, ﬁrm A has two plants, one in each country. Firm A0s plant in
the foreign country has by assumption lower costs than the one situated in
the home country and will be used to supply the foreign country.
Given this assumption, the two producers choose quantities as follows:
x,y =a r gm a x
x,y [(a − b(x + u) − w)x +( a − b(v + y) − w)y] (8)
u,v =a r gm a x
u,v [(a − b(v + y) − w)v +( a − b(x + u) − t − w)u] (9)
The Nash equilibrium entails the same level of sales in market H as in
regime I. This is secured by the segmented market hypothesis and the fact
that production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, leaving the
production decisions for the two markets independent. However, production
for the foreign market changes:






13The two sets w − 2t<2w − a and w + t<a+w
2 are mutually exclusive for w ≥ 0.
7This is simply the usual single market, linear demand Nash equilibrium
where both ﬁrms have costs w.
In the foreign market the link between union wage and market shares is
now broken. In regime II, unionized labor no longer takes the eﬀect of their
wage decision on exports into account.
3.3 Regime III. Full FDI
Finally, if ﬁrm A c h o o s e st om o v et h ee n t i r eh o m ep l a n ta b r o a d ,i n c u r r i n g
ac o s to fG, production for the two markets are symmetric and for the case
of the foreign country, equal to the production derived for regime II. For
the home market, however, the situation has changed and the two producers
now compete on equal basis, both incurring a trade cost when producing for
market H :




b if t ≤ a − w
0 if t > a − w
Of course, in regime III unionized labor no longer has a role to play, so
all production levels are independent of union wages.
3.4 Non-union benchmark
In this case, we assume both producers to have marginal costs equal to w.
It is easily veriﬁed that the following equilibrium production patterns then
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The expressions found in this section constitute the equilibrium produc-
tion patterns given wages and type of foreign direct investment. We now
turn to union wage setting, which will also be contingent upon the chosen
type of FDI.
4 Stage 2. Wage setting
In regime III, the unionized ﬁrm has moved all production facilities abroad,
and the union no longer has a role to play. However, in regime I and II, the
union faces diﬀerent employment possibilities, which will induce it to follow
8diﬀerent wage policies in the two regimes. We start out by investigating
regime I, where there is no FDI. This means that we will be close to the
model in Naylor (1999). The diﬀerences between our wage schedule and the
one found by Naylor, stems from the fact that here only one economy is
unionized, not both. The regime I wage schedule and the consequent union
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In ﬁgure 1, we have plotted the wage level (top) and utility (bottom)
against the trade cost (deﬂated by (a − w);dotted lines represent the regime
II case discussed later):
Figure 1. Union wage level and utility under regimes I and II
9The wage function in regime I (and union utility) is piecewise linear with
four segments, due to the following argument:
1. For high trade costs (more precisely for t ≥ 3
4(a − w)), the proper
autarky wage - that is, the wage that would be set if there was an
exogenous ban on trade - is low enough to stop trade from occurring.
This wage is then chosen by the union in this segment. In the language
of industrial organization, imports are blockaded.
2. If the union continues to choose the autarky wage for t<3
4(a − w),
the foreign competitor will choose to sell in country H. In the above
speciﬁed interval, the union will opt to lower the wage in order to stop
this from happening, capitalizing on the employment gain from such a
strategy. We are then still in autarky since no exports or imports take
place, but the possibility of trade inﬂuences outcomes. Imports are no
longer blockaded, but deterred.
3. The above strategy implies a sinking wage as trade costs fall. At some
point, the employment gain of such a strategy no longer justiﬁes the
low wage. For t<5
7(a − w), the union will instead adapt to imports,
setting a wage higher than the import deterring wage. A still lower
trade costs means a higher level of imports, and consequently, lower
domestic employment. More importantly for wages, however, is the
fact that the domestic labor demand elasticity to wages increases with
lower trade costs. As a response, the union lowers their wage claims
(and union utility falls) as in the previous segment, but the wages are
nevertheless higher than in thec a s eo fi m p o r td e t e r r e n c e .
4. As trade costs fall, the union - if adapting to imports - chooses to de-
crease wages. However, eventually, another strategy will prove to be
better: By setting a low enough wage, the union may be able to induce
the home ﬁrm to export. This strategy will entail a low wage, but high
employment as domestic production rises. The optimal wage schedule
under exports is rising with lower trade costs, while as we have seen, it
is falling if the union adapts to imports. At t =( 3
√
2−4)(a − w), the
two strategies provide the union with the exact same utility, and conse-
quently, for lower trade costs, the union chooses to induce exports.T h i s
implies a discontinuous fall in wages at t =( 3
√
2−4)(a − w). What re-
mains is then to explain why wages and utility is now rising with lower
trade costs. When these costs fall, the domestic ﬁrm gets easier access
to the foreign market. This, in turn, leads to increased domestic em-
ployment demand. At the same time, the competitor becomes a more
10ﬁerce rival at home, leading to the opposite eﬀect. However, the net
eﬀect is increased - and more importantly, more elastic - employment
demand. The union responds by setting higher wages and obtaining
higher utility.14 Qualitatively, this is the same eﬀect as is central in
Naylor’s work (Naylor (1998, 1999)).15,16
We now turn to regime II (partial FDI). In essence, from the viewpoint
o ft h eu n i o n ,r e g i m eI Ii ss i m p l yr e g i m eIw i t h o u tt h ee x p o r to p t i o n . 17 The
wage schedule is now piecewise linear with three segments. The low-wage
strategy to induce exports no longer makes sense. In reference to ﬁgure 1,
the utility and wage level continue to drop as trade costs fall below t =
(3
√
2 − 4)(a − w). This means that the high-wage strategy wage line with
one-way trade is prolonged into the range with the lowest values of t (dotted
lines).
Even though the wage now drops with lower trade costs, the wage is
higher than it would be if no investment was undertaken. When it already
has been decided to serve the foreign market through FDI, the desire to
induce exports no longer brings about wage moderation. The domestic wage
level increases, but employment falls and so thus union utility. However, the
domestic ﬁrm’s total wage bill may nonetheless decline: The higher domestic
wage is accompanied by production for the foreign market being undertaken
abroad, and wages there are by assumption lower.
14For a further discussion about this wage eﬀect, see our supplementary notes in Lom-
merud et. al. (2002). There, we also show that this kind of eﬀect from trade liberalization
would apply to a much larger set of demand systems than the family of linear systems
discussed here.
15Quantitatively, however, the wage increase following a trade cost reduction is smaller
here than in Naylor’s model. The Naylor model features an additional union in the foreign
country. The two unions act as Bertrand competitors in a wage game to attract employ-
ment. Their wage levels are strategic complements. If both unions respond to the above
incentive to increase wages, this in turn gives both unions a strategic complementarity
”push” to increase wages further.
16In Naylor’s framework, the segment of the wage schedule with one-way trade and a
wage that falls with lower trade costs, is not present. As indicated earlier, this comes
from our assumption of unionization in one country only, which naturally brings about
one-way trade. Also, due to only modeling one union, we ﬁnd a pure strategy equilibrium
for intermediate trade costs, contrary to Naylor (1999).
17The expressions for the wage and union utility in regime II can be found in Lommerud
et. al. (2002).
115 Stage 1. Location choice
In this section, we start out directing attention to the non-union case to
establish a benchmark. We then go on to discuss the eﬀects determining the
location choice when the home labor market is unionized. To keep things
instructive and short, we dispense with all mathematical expressions. For
the interested reader, there is a supplement available.18
5.1 Non-union benchmark
Proﬁts for this case can easily be derived from the equilibrium production
quantities of section 3. The following ﬁgure plots these proﬁts as a function
of the trade cost. Fixed costs are excluded.
Figure 2. Proﬁts in the non-unionized case
Both for regime I and II, there will be no trade for t ≥ 1
2(a − w). In this
case, the monopoly single market production quantities bring prices below
the trade costs, and consequently trade is blockaded. This does not apply in
regime III, as in this case, there is no producer located in country H. Here
there will be trade as long as the marginal willingness to pay exceeds the
trade costs (t<(a − w)).
In regime I, a reduction in trade cost beyond t = 1
2(a−w) has an ambigu-
ous eﬀect on producer A’s proﬁt. Lower trade cost results in more intense
rivalry between ﬁrms. On the one hand, producer A is hurt by facing a more
competitive rival - a rival with a lower trade cost - in its home market. On
the other hand, producer A gains by becoming a more competitive rival in its
neighboring market. In addition, producer A saves trade cost on its existing
quantity of trade. The larger the amount of trade initially, the more goods
18Lommerud et. al. (2002).
12are actually physically transported between the countries, and the larger the
direct cost saving. This explains why a reduction in trade cost has a negative
impact on proﬁts for high values of t - where trade is limited - and a positive
impact on proﬁts for low values of t.
In regimes II and III, the relationship between trade costs and proﬁts is
more straightforward. Under partial FDI (regime II), producer A does not
participate in international trade. The only eﬀect of lower trade costs (below
t = 1
2(a − w)) is a more competitive rival in country H,w h i c hh u r t st h e
proﬁt of producer A. In regime III, both producers face lower trade costs to
country H. As a result, both gain from a lower trade cost.
The ﬁgure also nicely illustrates the following:
Proposition 1 :
1. In the non-unionized case, full FDI (regime III) is never beneﬁcial.
2. For high trade costs (no trade in regime I), ﬁrm A will undertake partial
FDI (regime II) if the cost of this investment is less than the proﬁt
c a p t u r em a d ep o s s i b l eb yt h i si n v e s t m e n ti nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t .
3. For low t (trade in regime I), a trade cost reduction will make it less
proﬁtable/ more unproﬁtable to undertake partial FDI.
Proof. The supplement contains the necessary proofs.
If ﬁrm A chooses no investment, the trade costs oﬀer a shelter from intense
foreign competition for the producers in their respective home markets. If
full FDI is chosen, the producers are co-located in the same country. This
leads to tougher competition. This is never proﬁtable, which is summarized
in the ﬁrst part of the above proposition.
The second part refers to a regime II investment with double autarky
a sas t a r t i n gp o i n t . I nr e g i m eI ,i n i t i a t i n ge x p o r t si su n p r o ﬁtable for high
trade costs, and thus the only way to capture proﬁts from the other market
is to invest and produce there. Of course, the proﬁts earned must then be
compared with the ﬁxed costs of investment.
When we are not in initial autarky, trade prevails in the regime I equi-
librium. However, proﬁt capture from the other market may still be higher
if the ﬁrm instead invested in a new plant abroad. A trade cost reduction,
though, decreases the (tariﬀ-jumping) incentive to invest, as the export op-
tion becomes relatively cheaper. We can thus conclude:
Proposition 2 In the non-unionized case, trade liberalization by itself does
not trigger foreign direct investment.
Proof. See the supplement.
135.2 Location choice under unionization
Under unionization, FDI choices are steered not only by trade-cost jump-
ing considerations; international wage diﬀerences also matter. Unionization
raises wages above the competitive level, which generally increases the at-
tractiveness of FDI. This is a level eﬀect. However, as we have seen, wages
are dependent upon the trade costs and the investment strategy chosen. This
will in turn inﬂuence how trade liberalization aﬀects FDI decisions.
We start this section by explaining how a trade cost reduction aﬀects
proﬁts under the three diﬀerent investment scenarios spelled out above. We
then go on to discuss ﬁrm A’s incentives to switch to a regime II situation
(partial FDI) and to a regime III situation (full FDI). Finally, we bring the
discussions of the two types of FDI together, focusing on which of the diﬀerent
investment strategies that are optimal - no FDI, partial FDI and full FDI -
given assumptions about the ﬁxed investment costs J and G.
5.2.1 Proﬁts
The proﬁts of producer A in the diﬀerent regimes are illustrated in the fol-
lowing ﬁgure as a function of trade costs (investment costs again excluded):
Figure 3. Proﬁts for the unionized case
Proﬁts for the regime III case, ΠIII, are as for the non-union case since,
in both cases, all production is undertaken utilizing foreign labor. To explain
the two other proﬁt curves, we start out with the regime I case and from high
values of t, looking at how trade liberalization changes proﬁts:
For high levels of trade costs, imports are blockaded. No trade takes place
and the possibility of trade does not inﬂuence outcomes. Proﬁts are at the
one-market monopolist level (with unionized labor). The next segment still
describes an autarky situation, but here the union’s wage is set, as it were, to
14deter imports from the foreign country. The lower the trade cost, the lower
the wage, and the higher the proﬁts. The third segment of the proﬁtc u r v e
applies for one-way trade; from the low-cost foreign producer into ﬁrm A’s
home market. The lower the trade cost, the more competitive becomes the
foreign ﬁr m .I ti st r u et h a tt h eu n i o nl o w e r st h ew a g ei nr e s p o n s e ,b u ta sw e
see, this does not rescue proﬁts from falling with trade liberalization in this
segment. The fourth and last segment describes two-way trade between the
countries, which occurs for low trade costs. Proﬁts rise discontinuously as the
union decreases wages to induce exports.19 A further trade cost reduction
leads the domestic ﬁrm to gain easier access to the foreign market, while the
foreign ﬁrm gains easier access to the domestic market. The net eﬀect is
as for the non-union case: For high trade costs (within the two-way trade
i n t e r v a l )at r a d ec o s tr e d u c t i o nr e d u c e sp r o ﬁts, while the inverse is true for
low trade costs. However, due to the increasing wages, a trade cost reduction
is proﬁtable in a smaller interval than for the non-union case.
There are two diﬀerences between proﬁtc u r v e sΠI (no FDI) and ΠII (par-
tial FDI): For intermediate and large trade costs, the regime I domestic ﬁrm
does not supply the foreign market. In contrast, in regime II, the ﬁrm serves
the foreign market utilizing the plant abroad. With segmented markets and
constant marginal production costs, the existence of this new plant does not
aﬀect the competitor’s decisions concerning supply to the domestic market
(see section 3.2). Accordingly, ﬁrm A’s proﬁts in regime I and II diﬀer only
by the equilibrium proﬁts gained from access to the foreign market, and a
trade cost reduction aﬀects proﬁt si nt h er e g i m eI Ic a s ea si nr e g i m eI .
This changes for low trade costs where a regime I ﬁrm would choose to
export. Under partial FDI, exports are not an option, and a trade cost
reduction continues to decrease proﬁts (despite the union decreasing their
wage claims).
Let us now consider the incentives for the regime I producer to undertake
FDI. In the following ﬁgure we report the proﬁtability of each of the two
forms of FDI relative to no investment, given that G = J =0 :
19Naylor’s paradoxical result was that wages rise with lower trade costs from this point
on. As we have seen, however, wages are generally lower in this segment than they would
have been if the union did not have the opportunity to induce exports.
15Figure 4. FDI-incentives
Now, the costs of a regime II and a regime III investment may be very
diﬀerent. We therefore divide the following discussion into three parts: First
we assume that the costs of a regime III investment are prohibitive, so that
the relevant deliberation is between no investment and partial FDI. Then we
discuss the opposite situation, where full FDI is the only viable investment
strategy. Finally, we turn to the relative proﬁtability of the three investment
scenarios, determining a possible synthesis of the previous discussion.
5.2.2 Partial FDI
For high values of t, we have already discussed that a decision to undertake
partial FDI is determined by a comparison of the value of accessing the foreign
market as a duopolist and the ﬁxed investment costs. This result is basically
the same as for the non-union case (Proposition 1, second part). Arguably,
t h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n gc a s ei sw h e nt ≤ (3
√
2−4)(a − w). Trade liberalization
has been an on-going process for decades, so it seems intuitive that trade
costs in many markets may now have reached the point where two-way trade
takes place. For these low values of t, we see from ﬁgure 4 that the incentive
to undertake partial FDI is weaker, in general, than for higher trade costs.
This tallies well with the standard insight that it becomes less attractive to
serve a foreign market through FDI when exports are a viable alternative.
The surprising bit comes when we study how the incentives for partial
FDI change with a reduction in t, given two-way trade. For some of these
values of t, the incentives for a regime II investment are strengthened by
reduced trade costs, contrary to common wisdom. The reason for this lies in
the wage formation process. With no FDI, we have already explained that
w a g e sr i s ew i t hl o w e rt in this area. With partial FDI, wages are higher, but
falling with lower trade costs (cfr. ﬁg. 1). A motivation for partial FDI is to
16gain access to cheap foreign labor. On the cost side, the remaining domestic
workers will increase their wage in response to this. But the size of the wage
jump for domestic labor is smaller the lower the trade costs. This lies behind
the counter-intuitive result that a trade cost reduction can strengthen the
FDI alternative over the export alternative. We state this discussion as a
proposition:
Proposition 3 In a two-way trade situation, lower trade costs can strengthen
the incentive to serve a foreign market by FDI rather than by exports. This
is in contrast to the non-unionized case.
Proof. The proof is left to the interested reader.
However, the ‘standard’ eﬀect that lower trade costs make exports cheaper
is also present, and for very low values of t -w h e nt h ev o l u m eo fe x p o r t( i f
chosen) would be very high - it dominates: Lower trade costs then weakens
partial FDI incentives.
5.2.3 Full FDI
>From ﬁgure 4, it is also apparent that if the regime III investment cost,
G, is suﬃciently low, it will always be proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to move all
its production abroad. In contrast, in the non-unionized case moving all
production abroad was never proﬁtable (Proposition 2, ﬁrst part):
Proposition 4 In contrast to the non-unionized case, full FDI is always
proﬁtable provided the investment costs are suﬃciently small.
Proof. The proof is left to the interested reader.
There will always be a cost disadvantage in being located in a unionized
home country, so moving abroad would save costs. Further, this cost advan-
tage of FDI, plus the advantage of cheaper access to the foreign market, will
always outweigh the disadvantage of more costly access to the previous home
market - for low enough values of the ﬁxed cost G.
Turning to the impact of a trade cost reduction, we have already seen
that this may increase the incentives to undertake a regime II investment.
From ﬁgure 4, the eﬀect is even more apparent for the regime III investment
scenario. Full FDI avoids high production costs (wages) on the entire pro-
duction quantity of ﬁrm A, but comes at the expense of incurring trade costs
when supplying market H. A trade cost reduction makes this last negative
eﬀect lower, and thus contributes to higher investment incentives as trade
costs fall. However, there are two exceptions to this conclusion. First, for
high trade costs, the union may choose to lower wages to deter imports in
17regime I, as discussed in section 4 (part 2). This accounts for the upward
sloping segment of ∆ΠIII−I in ﬁgure 4. Second, the union may in regime I
choose to lower their wages to induce exports, which accounts for the discon-
tinuous shift in ∆ΠIII−I in ﬁgure 4. A trade cost reduction may therefore
reduce the incentives to invest if we ‘move across’ one of these intervals for
the trade cost, but the opposite may also very well happen. Referring to
Proposition 3, this proposition still holds for the case of full FDI.
Also, it is worth noting that for low trade costs, the regime I option
involves higher wages as trade costs fall (section 4, part 4). This means that
the ‘full FDI’ incentive curve, ∆ΠIII−I, is particularly steep in that segment
since a trade cost reduction both increases the equilibrium proﬁts in regime
III and helps evade the higher wages in regime I.
5.2.4 A possible synthesis
Next, let us consider what type of FDI the domestic ﬁrm will choose, given
that one of the forms of investment is taken for granted. Assuming G = J,
we can plot the diﬀerence in proﬁts for the two strategies:
Figure 5. Relative proﬁts from the two types of investment
The actual investment strategy will of course depend upon the costs of
the two FDI-choices, but the above ﬁgure nicely illustrates that the regime
III option may generally be the more proﬁtable one for low trade costs, while
the regime II investment strategy is better for high trade costs. This is so if
J = G. These costs might be very diﬀerent, though. The cost of establishing
a foreign plant might for example be only a fraction of the cost of moving the
whole ﬁrm abroad. Then partial FDI would be chosen also for low levels of
t. However, as discussed for the case of full FDI above, the ”wage-jumping”
eﬀects become increasingly important as trade costs fall. It is easily shown
that G has to exceed J by no less than three fourths’ of the duopoly proﬁts
in country F to make building a new plant a better alternative than moving
all production abroad no matter the level of trade costs.
186 Welfare analysis
In this section, we explore the welfare aspects of the optimal investment
decision discussed in the previous section. To do this, welfare under the
three investment schemes needs to be compared. We utilize a measure of
national welfare, calculated as the sum of consumer surplus in country H,
union utility and proﬁts for ﬁrm A. We assume that the costs of investment
a r er e a lr e s o u r c ec o s t s ,a n dt h e yi n ﬂuence national welfare through their
deduction in ﬁrm A0s net proﬁts.
Union utility and ﬁrm proﬁts have already been discussed in some depth.
In the supplement, we provide a discussion of consumer surplus in our model
as well as the expressions for national welfare. Here, we turn directly to na-
tional welfare, which is illustrated in ﬁgure 6 for the three regimes (assuming
again that G = J =0 ) :
Figure 6. National welfare in the three regimes
We are interested both in studying how trade liberalization aﬀects na-
tional welfare given an investment choice (no FDI, partial FDI and full FDI)
and if the investment incentives are correct from a national welfare viewpoint.
Within a given investment regime we see trade liberalization can reduce na-
tional welfare. To illustrate this, let us consider the case with one-way trade
- that is the third segment from the right of the national welfare curves of
regimes I and II: Here, a lower trade cost is good for consumers, as the foreign
ﬁrm becomes a more potent competitor in the market under study. Domestic
ﬁrms and workers suﬀer, however. In sum the eﬀect on welfare is negative. A
basic reason is that the increased proﬁts earned by the foreign ﬁrm as trade
is liberalized do not count in national welfare.
As can be observed from the ﬁgure, national welfare in regime II is always
higher than for regime I (remember that investment costs are set to zero).
For the case of high trade costs, this is entirely due to the proﬁts accrued by
19investing abroad, as union utility and consumer surplus are not aﬀected by
this move. However, for low trade costs (t<(3
√
2−4)(a − w)), the diﬀerence
is lower due to unions lowering their wage demands to induce exports in
regime I, which in turn gives lower domestic prices, higher union utility and
higher proﬁts. National welfare is only higher in regime III for low trade costs.
In this case, the higher proﬁts and the possibly increased consumer surplus
(see supplement) from investing abroad more than compensate for the drop
in union utility that follows a complete move of all production abroad.
We now turn to study whether or not the domestic ﬁrm has correct in-
vestment incentives from a welfare point of view. Since the union’s role is
the novel feature of our model, we want to focus on the distributional battle
between the union and the ﬁrm. When trade costs are high, there are no
trade. We have shown that the union’s wage setting is then unaﬀected by
a partial FDI decision. To allow the union to play a potential role, let us
therefore concentrate on the case with low trade costs. In particular, we
focus on the two-way trade situation. Attention is restricted to the case of
low trade costs also when discussing full FDI. This is done both to keep the
analysis compact, and because we feel that this for many markets constitutes
a reasonable assumption.
Focusing, then, on the two-way trade situation, we can show that there
might be over-investment in equilibrium:
Proposition 5 For low trade costs (two-way trade in regime I), a regime
I producer has, from a national welfare point of view, too large investment
incentives.
Proof. The proof is provided in the supplement.
T h i sh o l d sf o rb o t ht h e‘ p a r t i a lF D I ’c a s ea n dt h e‘ f u l lF D I ’c a s e .
If the ﬁrm chooses full FDI, union utility will of course fall. Consumer
surplus will generally rise when trade costs are low because competition be-
comes harsher than before.20 However, it can be shown that the fall in union
utility is larger than the possible gain in consumer surplus. Consequently,
national welfare increases by less than proﬁts. Thus there exists some range
of investment costs under which the ﬁrm would undertake the investment
while national welfare drops as a result.21
The incentives to undertake partial FDI are also too large seen from a
welfare point of view. While moving - if it is undertaken - would increase
20This does not apply for t very close to (3
√
2 − 4)(a − w) i nt h ec a s eo fas h i f tf r o m
regime I to regime III; see ﬁgure 1 in the supplement.
21In the supplement we show that the same is true if ﬁrm A is initially a regime II
producer and trade costs are above some very limited level.
20proﬁts, both union utility and consumer surplus invariably drops. Union
utility decreases because the domestic ﬁrm no longer exports to the foreign
market. Consumer surplus drops because the investment induces unionized
labor to increase its wage claims, which leads to decreased domestic sales.
7 Concluding remarks
W h a ts h a l lw em a k eo fa l lt h i s ?T h i si sn o tt h ep l a c et or e p e a ta l lo u rﬁndings.
We narrow our focus to the question of whether or not trade liberalization
between a unionized and a non-unionized country seriously weakens the po-
sition of unionized labor. Naylor’s result, in a somewhat diﬀerent model
format, that trade liberalization increases the union-set wage and utility can
be seen as an optimistic ”no” response to this question. In broad terms, we
have reached a much less rosy conclusion: Precisely because trade liberaliza-
tion has this tendency to increase union wages, the ﬁrm’s incentive to move
out production to a non-unionized economy is strengthened. Moreover, the
incentive for a full move of all production rather than a limited move only of
production destined for the foreign market, is also strengthened. Unionized
labor can lose from trade liberalization, but the problem might very well be
one of job losses, rather than wage cuts. From a welfare point of view, trade
liberalization can be detrimental to welfare. One important reason is that
ﬁxed investment costs are undertaken mainly to win a distributional bat-
tle between ﬁrm owners and unionized labor. But it also enters the picture
that trade liberalization can shift proﬁts from domestic capitalists to foreign
owners of non-unionized ﬁrms.
Speculatively, one could argue that after decades of economic integration,
even further trade liberalization should probably start from quite low levels of
trade costs. Moreover, we know that foreign direct investments become more
and more important relative to trade. These are precisely the circumstances
where further trade liberalization hurts the interests of unionized workers.
One should of course be careful about drawing strong policy conclusions
from a highly stylized model. But in broad terms our analysis suggests that
strong unions and trade liberalization do not sit well together. The right wing
version of this is to say that weaker unions would be good, since production
would then not be forced out of the country at the expense of national welfare.
A left wing alternative is that trade liberalization is the problem, since it
undermines the eﬀorts of ordinary workers to obtain a living wage.
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238 Supplement
In this supplement we provide some additional details concerning the analysis
reported in our paper. In Section 8.1 we show that a particualar wage eﬀect
of trade liberalization - lower trade cost leads to higher wages - would be the
outcome also with a more general demand system than linear demands. In
Section 8.2 we report wages and utility in regime II, which supplements the
last paragraph of Section 4 in the paper. In Section 8.3 we report proﬁts
in the non-union case, which supplements Section 5.1 in the paper. We also
provide proofs for propositions 1 and 2. In Section 8.4 we report proﬁts in
the unionized case, which supplements Section 5.2.1 in the paper. Section
8.5 provides calculus and discussion of consumer surplus, which is a part of
national welfare that is discussed in Section 6 in the paper. In Section 8.6
the explicit expressions for national welfare are reported, which supplements
Section 6 in the paper, and we provide a proof of Proposition 5. In addition,
we analyse the welfare eﬀect of a move from partial to full FDI, which is
referred to in footnote 21 in the paper.
8.1 The wage eﬀect of trade liberalization
In the main paper we argued that in regime I and for t ≤ (3
√
2−4)(a − w),
a trade cost reduction would increase wages (see Section 4, point 4 in the
paper). When setting the wage, the union will balance an increase in wages
against the employment reduction that follows from such a wage increase.
If the elasticity of labor demand to wages becomes less negative, the union
will face a less negative trade oﬀ between wages and employment, and con-
sequently increase wage claims. This is exactly what happens when trade
costs fall for t ≤ (3
√
2 − 4)(a − w), which is easily checked.
This kind of wage eﬀect from trade liberalization would apply to a much
larger set of demand systems than the linear ones discussed in the paper.
Following the above argument, a downward-sloping wage schedule would be
































∂t is negative whenever a trade cost
reduction leads to higher production by the unionized ﬁr m .T h i si st h ec a s e
in our model for equally large markets, but will generally hold if the foreign
24market is suﬃciently large relative to the home market: A trade cost reduc-
tion may decrease the home ﬁrm’s production for the home market through
a worsened competitive position. However, with a suﬃciently large foreign
market, this eﬀect will be more than compensated for by the increased pro-
duction for the foreign market, where the competitive position is improved
(with linear demand, this argument is valid as long as the foreign market
is more than half the size of the home market, measured in terms of the
parameter b).
Thus for a wide range of demand functions, assuming some some restric-





∂t is negative. Accordingly,
this analysis restricts attention to demand systems where ∂2L
∂w∂t is negative,
or positive to a limited degree (with linear demand, ∂2L
∂w∂t =0 ) .
8.2 Wages and union utility in regime II
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This supplements the discussion in the last paragraph of Section 4 in the
paper.
8.3 Proﬁts in the non-union case
The expressions for proﬁts in the non-union case is not reported in the paper,
but only plotted in ﬁgure 2 in Section 5.1. The proﬁts (denoted ΠNU) can
be derived from the equilibrium production quantities from section 3 of the
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(20)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2: Using the above expressions, the proof of the two
ﬁrst parts of proposition 2 is straightforward. For a regime II investment





9b . This is positive for t<a−w
2 , which proves the last part of the
proposition. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: Since a regime III investment is never proﬁtable,
we only have to make sure that d
dt(ΠII
NU − ΠI
NU) ≥ 0, which is left to the
interested reader. QED
8.4 Proﬁts in the unionized case
Proﬁts in the unionized case are plotted in ﬁgure 3 in Section 5.2.1 in the
paper. The explicit expressions for proﬁts in regime I (for ﬁrm A), gross of
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268.5 Consumer surplus
In Section 6 of the paper we study national welfare, which is deﬁned as the
sum of consumer surplus in country H, union utility and proﬁts for ﬁrm A.
Let us here report some calculus and discussion concerning the consumer
surplus. We assume consumer surplus to be approximated by the usual









where i denotes the regime in question. Using the previous results, we
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The above expression also depicts consumer surplus in regime II for t>
(3
√
2 − 4)(a − w). However, the regime II consumer surplus is given by
1
288b (7(a − w) − 5t)
2 for t ≤ (3
√
2 − 4)(a − w). For regime III, consumer
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These expressions are plotted against trade costs in ﬁgure 1:
Figure 1. Consumer surplus in the three regimes
As we would expect, consumer surplus is everywhere non-increasing in
trade costs, no matter the investment strategy chosen by ﬁrm A. When we
27compare regimes I and II, consumers are only aﬀected by this type of invest-
ment for low trade costs (when there is two-way trade). FDI then eliminates
the home workers’ incentive to moderate wage claims, so prices go up and
output down, and consumers lose. As we can observe from the ﬁgure, for
low trade costs consumer surplus in regime III is larger than in either of the
two other regimes. Competition is harsher after a complete outward move
of production. For low trade costs the extra cost of transport back into the
home market is of little signiﬁcance, so in sum consumers beneﬁt.
8.6 National welfare
National welfare is plotted in ﬁgure 6 in Section 6 in the paper. It is easily
veriﬁable that national welfare in the three regimes is given by the following
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√
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(29)
Proof of Proposition 5:F o rt<(3
√




















































16(a − w)2 − 36t(a − w) − 25t2
b
(35)
It is easily shown that ∆NWK−I − ∆ΠK−I < 0 in the relevant interval
t<(3
√
2 − 4)(a − w) for both K = II and K = III. Thus if the ﬁrm is
initially a regime I producer, for costs C (= G or J) of moving production
abroad such that ∆NW < C < ∆Π (superscripts excluded), the ﬁrm will
invest and this will lead to decline in national welfare. QED
A transition from regime II to regime IIIFor a regime II to regime III
transition, the following identity can be calculated (again superscripts ex-
cluded):
∆NW − ∆Π =
1
288
3(a − w)2 − 82t(a − w)+2 7 t2
b
The expression is positive for t< 1
27(a − w), and negative otherwise. A
transition from regime II to regime III involves a larger gain in consumer
surplus and a smaller drop in union utility than a transition from regime I to
regime III. For low trade costs (t< 1
27(a − w)), the rise in consumer surplus
from moving abroad outweighs the fall in union utility (it drops as trade costs
fall in regime II). If t is below such a threshold level, the national welfare
gain from a regime III investment is larger than the increase in proﬁts. For t
above such a threshold level, the opposite is true. This veriﬁes the claim in
footnote 21 in the paper at the end of Section 6.
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